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LAW ENFORCEMENT AND FIRM
FINANCING: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
Daniela Fabbri
University of Amsterdam
Abstract
This paper investigates the economic effects on firms’ policies of differences in law enforce-
ment. We find that in judicial districts where trials are longer, bank financing is more costly and
firms are smaller. However, we do not find any significant relation between law enforcement
and firms’ leverage ratio. We rationalize our results within a two- region dynamic general equi-
librium model with asymmetric information and collateralized credit contracts. We find that a
stronger enforcement of creditors’ rights not only improves credit conditions (partial equilib-
rium effect), but also fosters individual capital accumulation (general equilibrium effect). In
line with this theoretical prediction, we find a positive relation between individual savings and
quality of legal enforcement. (JEL: E20, K40, G32)
1. Introduction
A recent literature investigates the role of legal institutions in the development of
financial markets and in shaping firms’ characteristics, such as capital structure,
size of the firm, availability and cost of external financing, and ownership con-
centration. However, most of this evidence is based on cross-country analyses,
where it is difficult to separate the effects of differences in law from those of
differences in enforcement (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998; La Porta, de Silanes, and
Shleifer 1999; Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales 1999; Giannetti 2003, among others).
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In this paper, we isolate the economic effects of differences in the degree of
legal enforcement of creditor rights on firm decisions. We exploit domestic vari-
ability in the behavior of courts, using statistical information on the performance
of 50 judicial districts in Spain. More specifically, we measure the efficiency of
a judicial district either by the average length of trials concluded, or by the ratio
of trials concluded after one year to the total number of proceedings concluded.
We find that in less efficient judicial districts bank financing is costlier and
firms are smaller in size, after controlling for several firm characteristics, for the
degree of banking concentration, for regional economic development, and for
unobserved heterogeneity. However, we do not find any significant effect of law
enforcement on the firms’ leverage ratio.
We document that the distortions generated by an ill-functioning legal system
are not only statistically significant, but also economically relevant. We quantify
these effects by a hypothetical experiment. Attributing to the worst judicial district
the highest quality of law enforcement in our sample, firm size would increase
by 14% and the cost of bank credit would be lowered by about 16%.
We propose a theoretical explanation for these results, based on a two-period
overlapping-generations model. In the first period, the individual has no initial
wealth but can work and save. In the second period, he can only choose how
to invest his savings. Two alternatives are available: A bank deposit or a risky
entrepreneurial project. If he decides to become an entrepreneur, he applies for a
bank loan. Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we introduce moral hazard
by assuming that the outcome of the project depends on the unobservable effort of
the entrepreneur. He needs to invest his own savings (down payment) in the project
in order for the bank to grant its credit. We consider a fully collateralized credit
contract and assume that default is costly, the costs depending on the behavior of
courts. Inefficient courts reduce the recovery value of collateral assets.1 Finally,
we divide this economy into two regions with perfectly integrated capital markets
and segmented labor markets, differing only in the behavior of courts. In this
framework we show that, at the steady-state equilibrium, firms located in regions
with stricter enforcement of the right to seize collateral assets have access to less
costly external finance and are larger in size. However, the leverage ratio does not
differ between the two regions.
According to our model, the driving force is the interaction between partial
and general equilibrium effects. The partial equilibrium effect works through the
credit contract relation: Better legal protection of the creditor’s rights increases
the recovery value of collateral assets in bankruptcy and relaxes the bank’s par-
ticipation constraint. The availability of external finance for a given amount of
1. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the inefficient behavior of Spanish courts has economic effects
on creditors, because it can reduce the liquidation value of collateral assets (see the Spanish National
Report of the European Commission, 2003).
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entrepreneur’s initial wealth increases, and so does the profitability of the project.
The general equilibrium effect works through adjustments in labor markets, where
wages rise in the region with better legal protection. Higher wages have two con-
trasting effects: On the one hand, they reduce entrepreneurial profits, offsetting the
initial partial equilibrium benefit of better enforcement; this mechanism would
explain why we do not find cross-sectional differences in leverage ratios. On
the other hand, they foster individuals’ capital accumulation and increase the
entrepreneur’s saving (down payment). A larger down payment tempers moral
hazard and allows the entrepreneur to increase external financing and total profits.
We perform an additional empirical test to check whether the economic mech-
anism behind our empirical results may indeed be saving accumulation. Data on
individual savings from Spanish household accounts at the regional level offer
empirical support. We show that individuals working in the regions where trials
are shorter save more than in regions with longer trials.
Our paper has several original features. First, our data set is unique, because
it allows us to isolate the effects of law enforcement from the content of the law,
exploiting the varying efficiency of Spanish judicial districts in a single legal
framework. Spanish rules on credit relations are the same nationwide, but, as we
show in the paper, enforcement differs considerably from one judicial district to
another. Related papers have mostly used cross-country analyses and measured
differences in the content of the law (e.g., La Porta et al. 1997, 1998; La Porta,
de Silanes, and Shleifer 1999; Modigliani and Perotti 1997; Kumar, Rajan, and
Zingales 1999; Giannetti 2003). An important weakness of cross-country studies
is that indicators of judicial inefficiency are strongly negatively correlated with
income, and their significance often vanishes when income is controlled for. In our
paper, this is not the case. The sample correlation between the length of trials and
the level of economic activity by judicial district (measured by per capita GDP)
is, if anything, slightly positive, suggesting that more economically developed
judicial districts—those with higher income—provide somewhat weaker (rather
than stronger) law enforcement. In line with this preliminary finding, all our
empirical results are robust to the inclusion of per capita regional income (current
and past values, in level or in growth rates). As a consequence, the coefficient of
the legal variable does not pick up correlated regional differences in economic
factors.
Our data set also features information at the firm level obtained from the
Survey on Spanish Firm Strategies.2 This survey provides very detailed yearly
balance-sheet data—including yearly flow of bank financing and its cost—for
about 1,700 large, medium-sized, and small firms (listed and unlisted) operating
2. Other related papers, like Cristini, Moya, and Powell (2001) and Jappelli, Pagano, and Bianco
(2005), use aggregate data at the regional level.
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in all 17 Spanish regions.3 These two data sources provide new evidence on firm
policies. In line with descriptive international evidence (Rajan and Zingales 1995;
Booth et al. 2001), we find that variability in leverage ratios is not explained by
differences in creditor rights protection. We show a negative correlation between
law enforcement and cost of credit and a positive one between law enforcement
and firm size. Our analysis is more robust to endogeneity issues thanks to the
use of micro-data, because decisions at firm level are less likely to affect the
macroeconomic performance or the cost of law enforcement. In addition, all our
results hold after controlling for industry characteristics, for the business cycle
and for regional differences beyond the economic heterogeneity already captured
by per capita GDP.
An additional contribution of this paper is to offer a theoretical explanation
for our findings, using a market equilibrium model of corporate finance rather than
a partial equilibrium setting. Embedding a modified version of the Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997) model in a dynamic general equilibrium framework allows
us to capture not only the partial equilibrium effects related to increments in
the degree of law enforcement—improvements in credit conditions—but also
important general equilibrium effects, such as wage adjustments and changes on
individual capital accumulation. These effects, which have been overlooked in
the corporate finance literature to date, are crucial to account for our empirical
findings and also to explain the ambiguous evidence on the relation between legal
institutions and leverage ratios.4
Finally, the paper also adds to the literature on the relation between investor
protection and capital accumulation. The paper most resembling ours in this
respect is Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2004). In line with them, we intro-
duce investor protection in a simple extension of the two-period overlapping
generations model of capital accumulation. However, whereas they focus on the
effect of investor protection on growth, we are more interested in its effect on
corporate decisions. In their model, agents are risk-averse and investor protec-
tion affects the agent’s optimal risk sharing by determining the cost of hiding
resources. In our model, agents are risk-neutral and investor protection affects
the recovery value of collateral assets in bankruptcy and thus relaxes the bank’s
participation constraint.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe
the data and present our main empirical findings. In Section 3, we propose a
3. This survey was conducted by the Fundación Empresa Publica yearly from 1990 to 1999.
4. Most of the work investigating the implications of investor protection for corporate decisions has
been done in a static partial equilibrium setting, with few exceptions among which are Himmelberg,
Hubbard, and Love (2002) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002). Besides using a different theoretical
framework, they mostly investigate the relation between shareholder protection and ownership con-
centration. To our knowledge, Shleifer and Wolfenzon were the first to embed a model of corporate
finance similar to ours in a general equilibrium setting. However, besides other differences, they
use a static framework, which does not allow us to capture the effects of legal protection on capital
accumulation.
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general equilibrium model to explain our results. In Section 4, we investigate the
effects of differences in law enforcement on the behavior of firms. In Section 5,
we go back to the data to test some of the mechanisms implied by the model.
Section 6 concludes.
2. The Empirical Evidence
2.1. Data
2.1.1. Legal institutions in Spain. Several institutional features of Spain make
our data set unique. First, the rules on credit relations are the same nationwide,
but enforcement differs considerably between judicial districts. Spain is a civil-
law country, so the main function of the judicial system is enforcing the law.
Spanish law regulates criminal and civil offenses separately. There are no special
courts in Spain in charge of bankruptcy proceedings. Such cases are tried in
ordinary civil courts. We accordingly examine, here, civil trials, which are crucial
in defaults. The competent court is that of the borrower’s district of residence.
Spain is divided into 50 judicial districts, corresponding to the provinces. The
provinces are grouped into 17 regions, of which 7 (Asturia, Baleares, Cantabria,
Madrid, Murcia, Navarra, and Rioja) have one judicial district, and the other
10 have between 2 (Canarias and Extremadura) and 9 (Castilla-Leon). Table 1
matches judicial districts with regions in Spain.
We get the data on civil trials concluded by judicial district from an annual
survey by the National Institute of Statistics (INE), for the years 1990–1998.
Civil judicial statistics classify trials concluded into four duration classes: less
than two months, 2–6 months, 6–12 months, and more than a year. We use the
data for a sub-sample of civil trials that excludes a large number of cases not
related to financial contracts (matrimony, paternity, inheritance, juvenile courts,
and labor). This sample does not consist exclusively of bankruptcy proceedings,
but we assume that the duration of the trials included is closely correlated with
that of bankruptcy cases. Based on this information, we construct two indicators
of law enforcement by district and year. The first is the average length of trials
in days, obtained by multiplying the average length in each duration class by the
proportion of trials in that class (the last duration class being open, we assume an
average length of these trials of two years).5 Given the lack of information about
the precise timing pattern of trials, we assume uniform frequency distribution
within each class. The second measure is the proportion of trials concluded that
took more than 12 months, a rough gauge of the probability of having a long
trial. Enforcement cost is directly related to both measures. Longer trials increase
5. Anecdotal evidence suggests that our measure of length is conservative, because trials in this
category typically last longer.
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Table 1. Legal variables and economic activity by judicial district.
Judicial Corresponding Length of Trials Prob. Long GDP
Districts Regions (No. of Days) Trial (%) Index
1 2 3 4 5
1. Almeria Andalucia 204.79 9.21 0.70
2. Cadiz Andalucia 135.89 3.42 0.59
3. Cordoba Andalucia 69.70 0.0 0.56
4. Granada Andalucia 373.91 37.29 0.56
5. Huelva Andalucia 195.07 9.63 0.66
6. Jaen Andalucia 99.54 0.0 0.59
7. Malaga Andalucia 166 5.02 0.60
8. Sevilla Andalucia 269 21.11 0.61
9. Huesca Aragon 92.26 0.0 0.90
10. Teruel Aragon 51.76 0.0 0.86
11. Zaragoza Aragon 193.78 7.41 0.91
12. Asturias Asturias 248.15 16.08 0.73
13. Baleares Baleares 343.78 28.28 1.07
14. Las Palmas Canarias 298.10 21.05 0.70
15. Tenerife Canarias 332.82 0.29 0.80
16. Cantabria Cantabria 234.91 9.06 0.78
17. Avila Castilla-y-Leon 115.43 0.0 0.68
18. Burgos Castilla-y-Leon 173.17 3.86 0.87
19. Leon Castilla-y-Leon 117.3 0.12 0.66
20. Palencia Castilla-y-Leon 123.23 0.0 0.71
21. Salamanca Castilla-y-Leon 41.58 0.0 0.71
22. Segovia Castilla-y-Leon 146 1.96 0.79
23. Soria Castilla-y-Leon 74.79 0.09 0.82
24. Valladolid Castilla-y-Leon 346.50 35.62 0.81
25. Zamora Castilla-y-Leon 85.09 0.22 0.64
26. Albacete Castilla-La-Mancha 134.87 4.06 0.60
27. Ciudad Real Castilla-La-Mancha 129.91 2.48 0.66
28. Cuenca Castilla-La-Mancha 101.08 0.41 0.63
29. Guadalajara Castilla-La-Mancha 170.28 0.0 0.99
30. Toledo Castilla-La-Mancha 138.30 1.92 0.68
31. Barcelona Catalunia 287.63 19.69 0.96
32. Gerona Catalunia 121.25 2.0 1.06
33. Lleida Catalunia 58 0.03 0.64
34. Tarragona Catalunia 153.8 4.43 1.21
35. Alicante Comunidad Valenciana 297 24.35 0.72
36. Castellon Comunidad Valenciana 147.84 1.19 0.92
37. Valencia Comunidad Valenciana 353.41 36.36 0.84
38. Badajoz Extremadura 114.94 1.19 0.48
39. Caceres Extremadura 164.97 7.09 0.68
40. Coruna Galicia 278.19 22.22 0.66
41. Lugo Galicia 60.96 0.0 0.94
42. Pontevedra Galicia 91.32 0.89 0.62
43. Ourense Galicia 128.95 0.02 0.62
44. Madrid Madrid 453.48 47.41 1
45. Murcia Murcia 186.52 8.22 0.72
46. Navarra Navarra 157.38 0.08 0.98
47. Alava Pais Vasco 92.90 0.09 1.02
48. Guipuzcoa Pais Vasco 225.54 0.98 0.98
49. Vizcaya Pais Vasco 337.57 27.0 0.90
50. Rioja Rioja 94.68 0.68 0.91
Notes: Column (1) lists all the judicial districts in Spain. Column (2) maps judicial districts with regions. Columns (3)
and (4) report our two proxies of law enforcement (length of trials and probability of having a trial lasting more than one
year). Column (5) reports the ratio between the per-capita GDP of each judicial district and that of Madrid.
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Figure 1. Cross-regional variation in length of trials. The figure contains a map of Spain with
judicial districts having deeper shades of gray for increasing quality of law enforcement (decreasing
average length of trials). Each number corresponds to a different judicial district (see Table 1, column
(1), for the mapping between number and name of the district).
legal expenses, and until conclusion the creditor is exposed to the risk of asset
substitution by the debtor and unexpected changes in the value of the collateral.
Our indicators of judicial efficiency vary considerably between districts and
over time. Table 1 reports the sample average of the two legal variables for each
district. Dispersion is very high. The average length of a trial is 373 days in
Granada versus 58 days in Lleida, namely, almost seven times longer. This pattern
is confirmed by the second proxy. In Avila, Teruel, or Huesca, the probability of
having a long trial is zero, whereas in Madrid it is 47%. The map in Figure 1
illustrates the cross-sectional variability of law enforcement, with judicial districts
having deeper shades of gray for increasing enforcement—decreasing average
length. A potential reason for the strong cross-sectional variability could be that
financial and human resources are allocated according to the number of residents
in the district, which is probably not suited to capture the actual demand for justice,
because it fails to take account of differences in the frequency of litigation and in
the complexity of civil trials. So some districts presumably lack resources, and
enforcement there is accordingly inefficient.
Figure 2 displays the variation in length of trials over time for three districts,
Madrid, Navarra, and Rioja, selected as instances of poor, average, and good
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Figure 2. Time-series variation in length of trials. The figure shows the variation of the length of
trails of three selected judicial districts from 1990 to 1998. The three districts (Madrid, Navarra, and
Rioja) correspond to low, average, and high quality of law enforcement.
enforcement, respectively. The figure shows a distinct pattern in each district.
The visual intuition is confirmed by the calculation of the serial correlation over
time. The correlation is positive for all regions. It ranges widely from 0.03 to 0.89,
with an average of 0.54, suggesting considerable heterogeneity. In summary, the
evidence shows a substantial variability in law enforcement both cross-sectionally
and in the time-series.
In addition to this geographical and time variability, our legal variable has
another key advantage. A major weakness of cross-country studies of law enforce-
ment is that indicators of judicial inefficiency have a strong negative correlation
with income, and their significance often disappears when income is controlled
for. In our study, this is not the case. Figure 3 displays the sample correlation
between the length of trials and the level of economic activity (proxied by the per
capita GDP index shown in column (5) of Table 1) by district. The correlation
is slightly positive and equal to 0.034.6 Because our legal variables measure the
6. We obtain similar levels of correlation using the probability of a long trial as a proxy for law
enforcement, or measuring the correlation between legal enforcement and economic activity by
region rather than by judicial district, or taking aggregate rather than per capita GDP.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jeea/article-abstract/8/4/776/2295908/Law-Enforcement-and-Firm-Financing-Theory-and
by guest
on 26 September 2017
784 Journal of the European Economic Association
Figure 3. Length of trials and per capita gross domestic product by judicial district. The figure
shows the correlation between the length of trails and the per capita gross domestic product index,
by judicial district. The values are taken from columns (3) and (5) of Table 1.
inefficiency of the judicial system, this means that more developed districts (with
higher fiscal income) have slightly weaker creditor protection. As a result, our
legal variable does not pick up regional differences in economic conditions. The
empirical analysis will confirm this provision.
The lack of cross-sectional correlation between income and enforcement is
due to a crucial institutional characteristic of the Spanish judicial system. Spain
is a federation of 17 regions endowed with very substantial autonomy in a num-
ber of spheres. However, the administration of justice is the responsibility of the
central government, which selects and appoints judges, magistrates, and auxiliary
staff and determines the allocation of financial and human resources to each judi-
cial district. Judicial expenses are financed by federal tax revenues and resource
allocation is not based on regional economic development. This feature is cru-
cial for our analysis, because it removes any possible institutional link between
enforcement and regional tax revenue.
2.1.2. Firm characteristics. Firm-level data are drawn from the Survey on
Firm Strategies. The survey was conducted yearly by the Fundación Empresa
Publica from 1990 to 1999. We explore both cross-sectional and time-series vari-
ation. The survey provides information and balance-sheet data for 1,700 large,
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medium-sized, and small manufacturing firms (listed and non-listed) all over the
country. For each firm the survey provides the location by region.7
The survey also provides general information on the production activity (num-
ber of industrial plants, ownership structure, age of the firm, number of workers,
characteristics of products, total sales, production costs, technology, structure of
the product market). Manufacturing firms are classified into 18 sectors according
to NACE-CLIO: meat food; food and tobacco products; beverage products; tex-
tiles and textile products; leather and leather products; wood and wood products;
pulp, paper, paper products, publishing, and printing; chemical products; rubber
and plastic products; non-metallic mineral products; iron products; basic metals
and fabricated metal products; machinery and equipment; electrical and optical
equipment; motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers; other transport equipment;
furniture and manufacturing; other manufactured products.
We show summary statistics of firm variables in Table 2, Panel (A), and we
report the precise definition of these variables in Table 2, Panel (C). The average
age of a firm in our sample is about 25 years, with individual cases ranging
between 1 and 269 years. The average number of employees is 269; 68.10% of
the firms in our sample have fewer than 200 employees and 88.72% fewer than
500. The share of firms belonging to groups of firms is 29.30%. In 2.74% of our
sample the public sector has an equity stake. Only 3.76% are listed. In short, the
sample consists mostly of small and medium-sized manufacturing firms.
Balance-sheet data are very detailed. We have information on tangible and
intangible assets. Tangible assets include machineries, plants, and buildings
and the intangible assets correspond to research and development expenditures.
Table 2, Panel (A), shows that the average intangibility ratio is relatively low.
This depends on the large number of firms (51% of our sample) that do not have
any research and development activity. On the liability side, we can distinguish
between debt to financial institutions (among which banks) and other liabilities.
The average leverage ratio is 30%. In our sample, 59% of the firms have debt to
banks; the majority of them have less than 45 employees, suggesting that firms
using bank finance are mostly of small size. Bank financing is the most impor-
tant source of external finance: The average share of bank debt over total debt
is 68%. For each type of debt, the survey reports the average interest rate. This
information is crucial to our analysis, because it gives us a very precise measure
of the cost of bank financing. Table 2, Panel (A), shows that the average cost of
bank finance is 9.7%. For a small number of firms (1% of the sample) external
financing is very costly (above 18%).
7. Because the firm’s survey provides only information about the location of firms by region, we
aggregate the judicial data by region in order to match the legal variables with the firm variables.
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2.2. Methodology
To isolate the effect of law enforcement on firm financing, we examine three firm
variables: the firm’s cost of credit, size, and leverage ratio. The cost of credit
is defined as the average rate paid on the cumulative stock of debt to banks.
Following most of the literature (Petersen and Rajan 1995, 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt
and Maksimovic 1998, among others), we measure size by the total stock of
capital.8 Finally, leverage is defined in standard fashion as financial debt (short-
term plus long-term debt to financial institutions) over the sum of book value of
equity plus financial debt.
As noted, our measure of law enforcement is the average length of trials.
Explanatory variables also include several firm characteristics. Following related
papers (see, among others, Diamond 1989), we include firm’s age as a proxy for
the firm’s reputation. We test for the presence of non-linear effects by controlling
for the square of the age. Following Giannetti (2003), who documents systematic
differences in leverage between listed and unlisted firms, we add a listing dummy.
We also control for the degree of asset intangibility, as suggested by Fan, Titman,
and Twite (2003) and Giannetti (2003), among others. Because intangible assets
have low collateral value, we expect asset intangibility to be correlated negatively
with external financing and leverage and positively with the cost of credit. Finally,
we include the size of the firm as a control variable in the specifications of the
cost of credit and leverage, because both are likely to depend on size.
We also control for the degree of concentration of the banking industry
through the Herfindahl Index. Other things being equal, we expect banking con-
centration to raise interest rates, reflecting a less competitive credit market and
possibly closer bank-firm relations. We also control for differences in the regional
economic development, including regional per capita income (GDP) as a regres-
sor. As noted, regional budget considerations should not affect our analysis for
two reasons. First, the resources allocated to judicial districts come out of the
federal budget, not regional taxes, so there are no institutional links between the
quality of law enforcement and the level of economic development. Second, there
is a slightly positive correlation between legal costs and economic activity. This
suggests that more developed regions or judicial districts have somewhat more
inefficient courts. Table 2, Panel (B), reports summary statistics of Herfindahl
Index and GDP.
Our data set pools a panel of firms (observations across industries, regions,
and years) with a panel of judicial data (observations across regions and years).
We estimate each equation using fixed-effects regressions at firm level. We also
include a full set of industry and regional dummies to take account for any
potential cross-industry and cross-regional heterogeneity (beyond the economic
8. Our findings are not sensitive to different gauges of firm size, such as number of workers. This is
no surprise, given the high sample correlation (0.83) between stock of capital and number of workers.
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heterogeneity captured by the GDP), and a full set of year dummies to control
for cyclical effects.
In summary, we estimate the following specifications:
Yijt = α0 + α1Ageijt + α2(Ageijt)2 + α3Listedijt + α4Intangijt
+ α5Legalcostsjt + α6GDPjt + α7Herfindahlj t + αDD + εijt, (1)
where Yijt is either the cost of credit, the leverage, or the size of the firm; αD ,
ψD , and δD are vectors of parameters; D is the matrix of industry, regional, and
year dummies; and the indices i, j , t refer to the firm, the region, and the time
period, respectively.
2.3. Results
Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (1) for the cost of external finance.
The sample used in this estimation only includes firms with positive amount of
debt (hence positive cost of debt).9 Column (1) refers to the basic specification,
using only firm-level variables. The coefficient of the legal variable is positive
and significant at the 1% level; because enforcement is measured by the average
length of trials, our evidence suggests that external finance costs more for firms
located in the districts where trials are longer. The coefficient of Age is negative
and statistically significant at the 11% level, that of Age Squared is positive but
not significant. That is, financing is more costly for younger firms, in line with
established evidence and intuition (age as a proxy for reputation). The coefficient
of size is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that,
unsurprisingly, larger firms pay lower interest rates. Stock exchange listing does
not affect the cost of credit, and a high degree of asset intangibility increases
it, as banks presumably charge higher interest rates to compensate for the low
collateral value of intangible assets.
All our results remain qualitatively unaltered controlling for the banking
concentration (column (2)). The positive coefficient of the Herfindahl Index indi-
cates that banks charge higher rates when they face less competition. However,
9. Using firms with positive cost of debt could introduce a sample selection problem, if banks
located in bad judicial districts set collateral requirements as a condition to provide credit. These
requirements could be high enough that some firms are excluded from funding and are thus credit-
constrained. We test formally for sample selectivity, using the two-stage Heckman procedure. In the
first stage, we estimate a probit model, where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if bank
debt is positive (the firm is not credit-constrained) and zero otherwise (the firm is credit-constrained).
We include law enforcement among the regressors. The definition of credit rationing used in the probit
model is subject to two caveats. First, all firms with zero debt are credit-constrained, while some
of them may not have debt because they do not need it. Second, firms can be credit-constrained
even with positive debt, as long as their demand of bank funds has been satisfied only partially. The
lack of information prevents us from using more precise measures of bank rationing. The two-stage
Heckman procedure produces a coefficient of the Mill’s ratio not statistically different from zero at
conventional levels. We obtain the same conclusion estimating the model with maximum likelihood.
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Table 3. Legal costs and the cost of bank debt.
Dependent variable: cost of bank debt
(1) (2) (3)
Legal Costs 0.0016∗∗ 0.0018∗∗ 0.0018∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Age −0.0100 −0.0100 0.0099
(0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064)
Age Squared 3.85e-05 3.68e-05 3.68e-05
(3.67e-05) (3.67e-05) (3.67e-05)
Listed Firm −0.0828 −0.0873 −0.0873
(0.4105) (0.4105) (0.4106)
Asset Intangibility −0.4006 −0.3982 −0.38984
(0.3427) (0.3427) (0.3428)
Size −5.436∗∗∗ −0.5403∗∗∗ −0.5402∗∗∗
(0.1000) (0.1000) (0.1000)
Herfindahl Index 4.87e-04 4.87e-04
(4.30e-04) (4.30e-04)
GDP −0.0018
(0.0285)
Fixed Effects
- Firm YES YES YES
- Industry YES YES YES
- Region YES YES YES
- Year YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq 0.7554 0.7553 0.7553
No. of obs. 5,118 5,118 5,118
Notes: The dependent variable is the average interest rate on the stock of bank debt. We report the coefficients obtained
through fixed-effects regressions at the firm level and the corresponding standard errors in brackets. Each regression
includes 18 industry dummies, a full set of regional dummies to control for unobserved geographical heterogeneity, and a
full set of year dummies to control for aggregate shocks. The dummy results are not reported to save space. The variable
Legal Costs is the average length of trials concluded in days. Age is the number of years since the foundation of a firm. Age
Squared is the square of the firm’s age. Listed is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed and zero otherwise.
Asset Intangibility is the share of research and development expenditures over total capital. Size is the logarithm of the
stock of capital. Column (1) refers to the baseline specification. Column (2) adds the Herfindahl Index (squared sum of
the share of credit provided by all the banks operating in the reference market) to the set of explanatory variables. Column
(3) includes also the per-capita level of the regional gross domestic product, GDP, to control for geographical differences
in the degree of economic activity. **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%.
this effect is not statistically significant at the conventional levels. Our finding
contrasts with Jappelli, Pagano, and Bianco (2005), who show an ambiguous rela-
tionship between cost of credit and judicial efficiency in Italy, when the degree
of banking concentration is factored in. Finally, in column (3), we control for the
cross-sectional differences in economic development by the regional per capita
GDP. GDP seems to be uncorrelated with the firm-specific cost of bank finance
and the result on the legal variable does not change.
In Table 4, the dependent variable is the size of the firm. The legal variable
has a negative and statistically significant coefficient, suggesting that firms in
more efficient districts are bigger. As expected, older firms are larger, although the
positive effect of age on size decreases over time (the coefficient of Age Squared is
negative). Listed firms are larger, but the coefficient is not statistically significant,
probably because there are few listed firms in our sample (only 3.76%). Firms with
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Table 4. Legal costs and firm size.
Dependent variable: firm size
(1) (2) (3)
Legal Costs −3.24e-04∗∗∗ −3.6e-04∗∗∗ −3.59e-04∗∗∗
(1.07e-04) (1.08e-04) (1.08e-04)
Age 0.0056∗∗∗ 0.0056∗∗ 0.0056∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Age Squared −3.25e-05∗∗∗ −3.23e-05∗∗∗ −3.24e-05∗∗∗
(6.36e-06) (6.36e-06) (6.36e-06)
Listed Firm 0.0748 0.0749 0.0749
(0.0566) (0.0566) (0.0566)
Asset Intangibility −0.4635∗∗∗ −0.4635∗∗∗ −0.4636∗∗∗
(0.0378) (0.0378) (0.0378)
Herfindahl Index −1.24e-04∗∗ −1.25e-04∗∗
(6.08e-05) (6.08e-05)
GDP −0.0019
(0.0039)
Fixed Effects
- Firm YES YES YES
- Industry YES YES YES
- Region YES YES YES
- Year YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq 0.9810 0.9810 0.9810
No. of obs. 10,179 10,179 10,179
Notes: The dependent variable is the size of the firm, measured by the logarithm of the stock of capital. We report the
coefficients obtained through fixed-effects regressions at the firm level and the corresponding standard errors in brackets.
Each regression includes 18 industry dummies, a full set of regional dummies to control for unobserved geographical
heterogeneity, and a full set of year dummies to control for aggregate shocks. The dummy results are not reported to save
space. The variable Legal Costs is the average length of trials concluded in days. Age is the number of years since the
foundation of a firm. Age Squared is the square of the firm’s age. Listed is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm
is listed and zero otherwise. Asset Intangibility is the share of research and development expenditures over total capital.
Column (1) refers to the baseline specification. Column (2) adds the Herfindahl Index (squared sum of the share of credit
provided by all the banks operating in the reference market) to the set of explanatory variables. Column (3) includes also
the per-capita level of the regional gross domestic product, GDP, to control for geographical differences in the degree of
economic activity. **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%.
a smaller share of intangible assets are also larger, likely because R&D expenses
are standardized by total assets. As in the previous table, all the results remain
qualitatively the same when we control for banking concentration (column (2))
or for regional differences in economic activity (column (3)).
Table 5 shows the results for the leverage ratio. The coefficient of the legal
variable is not statistically significant, suggesting that the performance of courts
does not explain variations in the leverage ratio.10 The leverage ratio does not
10. In line with our findings, there is descriptive evidence from Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth
et al. (2001) that differences in leverage across G-7 countries are not so large. Our finding contrasts
both with cross-country analyses (Fan, Titman, and Twite 2003; Giannetti 2003) and with national
analyses, (Shuetrim, Lowe, and Morling 1993; Castanias 1983; Gertler and Gilchrist 1993) that
find a positive correlation between enforcement and leverage. However, an important distinguishing
feature of our work could explain the different result. Whereas we interpret bankruptcy costs as costs
related to the behavior of courts and measure them using statistical information on trials concluded,
the papers cited above use firm variables, like the size of the firm. If the size of the firm itself depends
on the enforcement, then the results could be altered by endogeneity.
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Table 5. Legal costs and leverage ratio
Dependent variable: leverage ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Legal Costs −2.65e-05 −2.8e-05 −2.81e-05
(5.00e-05) (5.06e-05) (5.06e-05)
Age −6.86e-06 −6.56e-06 −7.88e-06
(4.35e-04) (4.35e-04) (4.35e-04)
Age Squared 2.04e-07 2.13e-07 2.19e-07
(2.77e-06) (2.77e-06) (2.77e-06)
Listed Firm 0.0037 0.0037 0.0037
(0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0242)
Asset Intangibility −0.0053 −0.0053 −0.0053
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119)
Size 0.0623∗∗∗ 0.0623∗∗∗ 0.6233∗∗∗
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058)
Herfindahl Index −5.48e-06 −5.25e-06
(2.87e-05) (2.87e-05)
GDP 9.96e-04
(0.0017)
Fixed Effects
- Firm YES YES YES
- Industry YES YES YES
- Region YES YES YES
- Year YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq 0.7236 0.7235 0.7235
No. of obs. 8,332 8,332 8,332
Notes: The dependent variable is the leverage ratio defined as debt over debt plus equity (short term plus long term debt
toward financial institutions over the sum of book value of equity and financial debt). We report the coefficients obtained
through fixed-effects regressions at the firm level and the corresponding standard errors in brackets. Each regression
includes 18 industry dummies, a full set of regional dummies to control for unobserved geographical heterogeneity, and a
full set of year dummies to control for aggregate shocks. The dummy results are not reported to save space. The variable
Legal Costs is the average length of trials concluded in days. Age is the number of years since the foundation of a firm. Age
Squared is the square of the firm’s age. Listed is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed and zero otherwise.
Asset Intangibility is the share of research and development expenditures over total capital. Size is the logarithm of the
stock of capital. Column (1) refers to the baseline specification. Column (2) adds the Herfindahl Index (squared sum of
the share of credit provided by all the banks operating in the reference market) to the set of explanatory variables. Column
(3) includes also the per-capita level of the regional gross domestic product, GDP, to control for geographical differences
in the degree of economic activity. ***Significant at 1%.
seem to depend on age, listing, or asset intangibility; conversely, larger firms are
more leveraged.
In summary, our findings indicate that the behavior of courts does affect the
cost financing to firms and their size. This effect is robust to year and regional
fixed-effect controlling for aggregate shocks and unobserved cross-sectional het-
erogeneity, but also to regional per-capita GDP, controlling for idiosyncratic
regional economic shocks. Furthermore, if we use the other proxy for law enforce-
ment (the proportion of trials concluded after one year), we obtain the same results
in all our specifications.
As a last finding, we document that the distortions generated by a poorly
functioning legal system are not only statistically significant but also economically
relevant. We quantify these economic effects by a simple experiment. We compute
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the estimated reduction in the cost of bank credit and increase in firm size that
would result from upgrading the district with the worse efficiency to top quality
of enforcement in our sample. This would increase firm size by 14% and reduce
the cost of credit by about 16% (corresponding to a reduction of 0.68 percentage
points on an average cost of credit of 4.17%).
2.4. Robustness Checks
2.4.1. Large outliers. We want to make sure that our results are not driven
by large outliers, re-estimating the specifications for different sub-samples. If
large outliers drive the enforcement effect, it should disappear in at least one sub-
sample. Tables 6 and 7 report the results of this robustness check for credit cost and
firm size.11 We define the sub-samples using three thresholds: 50 workers (column
(1)), 250 workers (column (2)), and 500 workers (column (3)), corresponding to
the 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of our sample, or, roughly speaking, small,
medium-sized, and large firms.
In Table 6, the legal variable keeps the positive sign in all three specifications.
Moreover, the statistical significance increases when the sample includes the 75th
and the 90th percentile of firms, possibly because of the increment in the number of
observations with respect to the smallest sub-sample. Interestingly, the economic
significance of the legal variable decreases monotonically when the sub-sample
includes larger firms. This qualitative pattern suggests that legal inefficiency has
a stronger economic impact on the cost of credit when firms are smaller.
Table 7 shows the same robustness check for firm size. The legal variable
keeps its negative sign in the three specifications. As in the previous table, its
statistical significance increases when we enlarge the sample and its economic
impact is greater for the smallest half (column (1)), suggesting again that enforce-
ment is likely to have a stronger impact on the size of smaller firms. One possible
reason could be that large firms can choose their location strategically and are thus
more likely to be located in the more efficient judicial districts, whereas small and
medium-sized firms tend to be owner-managed and located near to the owner’s
residence.
2.4.2. Lagged legal enforcement. One of our main findings is that the effect of
court activity is not only statistically but also economically significant. We obtain
this result by exploiting both cross-sectional and time-series variation in the legal
variable. One could claim that temporal changes in court efficiency take time to
affect firms’ decisions, so our simultaneous legal variable might fail to capture
11. This robustness check confirms that the legal variable does not have a statistically significant
effect on leverage. The results for leverage are not shown but are available on request.
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Table 6. Sub-samples and the cost of bank debt.
Dependent variable: cost of bank debt
(1) (2) (3)
≤ 50 workers ≤ 250 workers ≤ 500 workers
50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile
Legal Costs 0.0023∗∗ 0.0022∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Age −0.0213 −0.112 −0.0160∗
(0.0162) (0.0107) (0.0085)
Age Squared 9.53e-05 4.07e-05 7.41e-05
(1.28e-04) (8.08e-05) (5.87e-05)
Listed Firm 0.7053 0.0140 −0.0517
(1.3119) (0.7040) (0.5377)
Asset Intangibility −0.0788 −0.4245 −0.4374
(0.5402) (0.3618) (0.3489)
Size −0.6575∗∗∗ −0.5896∗∗∗ −0.5564∗∗∗
(0.1444) (0.1139) (0.1044)
Herfindahl Index 4.62e-04 6.36e-04 6.06e-04
(6.20e-04) (5.05e-04) (6.20e-04)
GDP −0.0022 −0.0013 0.0011
(0.0319) (0.0296) (0.0286)
Fixed Effects
- Firm YES YES YES
- Industry YES YES YES
- Region YES YES YES
- Year YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq 0.7485 0.7531 0.7581
No. of obs. 2,667 3,885 4,626
Notes: The dependent variable is the average interest rate on the stock of bank debt. We report the coefficients obtained
through fixed-effects regressions at the firm level and the corresponding standard errors in brackets. Each regression
includes 18 industry dummies, a full set of regional dummies to control for unobserved geographical heterogeneity, and a
full set of year dummies to control for aggregate shocks. The dummy results are not reported to save space. The variable
Legal Costs is the average length of trials concluded in days. Age is the number of years since the foundation of a firm. Age
Squared is the square of the firm’s age. Listed is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed and zero otherwise.
Asset Intangibility is the share of research and development expenditures over total capital. Size is the logarithm of the
stock of capital. Herfindahl Index is the squared sum of the share of credit provided by all the banks operating in the
reference market. GDP is the per-capita level of the regional gross domestic product. Columns (1), (2), and (3) refer
to sub-samples of firms with a number of workers lower or equal to 50 workers, to 250 workers, and to 500 workers,
respectively. **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%.
the full time-series effect. This argument is likely to be more relevant for size
than credit cost, because size is presumably a more persistent variable.
We address the issue by using a specification in which the legal variable is
lagged. To eliminate noise we use the lagged two-year average of length of trials.
Column (1) of Tables 8, 9, and 10 shows the coefficients for cost of credit, firm
size, and leverage. The enforcement variable keeps the same sign and similar
magnitude as in the basic specifications.
2.4.3. The role of executory titles. The Spanish bankruptcy system provides for
executory titles that give the creditor the right to enforce his credits without the
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Table 7. Sub-samples and firm size.
Dependent variable: firm size
(1) (2) (3)
≤ 50 workers ≤ 250 workers ≤ 500 workers
50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile
Legal Costs −3.66e-04∗ −3.04e-04∗∗ −3.56e-04∗∗∗
(1.97e-04) (1.38e-04) (1.19e-04)
Age 9.488e-05 0.0087∗∗e-03 0.0080∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0012)
Age Squared −7.97e-07 −6.09e-05∗∗∗ −5.51e-05∗∗∗
(1.95e-05) (1.14e-05) (9.23e-06)
Listed Firm 1.1316 0.1286 0.0771
(0.2572) (0.1295) (0.0904)
Asset Intangibility −0.6287∗∗∗ −0.6166∗∗∗ −0.4544∗∗∗
(0.0705) (0.0529) (0.0393)
Herfindahl Index −1.49e-04 −1.84e-04∗∗ −1.90e-04∗∗∗
(1.01e-04) (7.66e-05) (6.75e-05)
GDP 8.13e-04 0.0013 −0.0014
(0.0049) (0.0043) (0.0041)
Fixed Effects
- Firm YES YES YES
- Industry YES YES YES
- Region YES YES YES
- Year YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq 0.9144 0.9638 0.9743
No. of obs. 4,823 7,605 9,047
Notes: The dependent variable is the size of the firm, measured by the logarithm of the stock of capital. We report the
coefficients obtained through fixed-effects regressions at the firm level and the corresponding standard errors in brackets.
Each regression includes 18 industry dummies, a full set of regional dummies to control for unobserved geographical
heterogeneity, and a full set of year dummies to control for aggregate shocks. The dummy results are not reported to save
space. The variable Legal Costs is the average length of trials concluded in days. Age is the number of years since the
foundation of a firm. Age Squared is the square of the firm’s age. Listed is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm
is listed and zero otherwise. Asset Intangibility is the share of research and development expenditures over total capital.
Herfindahl Index is the squared sum of the share of credit provided by all the banks operating in the reference market.
GDP is the per-capita level of the regional gross domestic product. Columns (1), (2), and (3) refer to sub-samples of firms
with a number of workers lower or equal to 50 workers, to 250 workers, and to 500 workers, respectively. *Significant at
10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%.
need for a trial. It is likely that the frequency of these contracts, hence the number
of cases that reach courts, depends on the quality of courts. In particular, we
expect agents to be more interested in such titles where courts are inefficient. In
this case, the relation between credit conditions and judicial enforcement may be
non-linear. For short or moderate length of trials, the firm’s financing decisions
are likely to depend on our legal variable, but beyond some critical length the
relation could be weaker, because firms resort more often to executory titles. The
use of executory titles would thus tend to decrease the average length of trials
in less efficient districts, and with it the cross-sectional variability of the legal
indicator. If anything, then, this bias would work against the significance of the
legal variable.
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Table 8. Lagged and non-linear legal costs and the cost of bank debt.
Dependent variable: Cost of bank debt
Lagged Legal Costs Non-Linear Legal Costs
Bi-Annual Lagged Average Box–Cox Transformation
λ̂: −0.0038 (s.e.: 0.67)
log(x) (xλ − 1)/λ
(1) (2) (3)
Legal Costs 0.0016∗ 0.3625∗ 0.3559∗
(0.009) (0.1974) (0.1934)
Age −0.0105 −0.0102 −0.0102
(0.0071) (0.0064) (0.0064)
Age Squared 3.96e-05 3.80e-05 3.79e-05
(3.87e-05) (3.67e-05) (3.67e-05)
Listed Firm −0.2962 −0.0816 −0.0816
(0.4871) (0.4107) (0.4107)
Asset Intangibility −0.3882 −0.4146 −0.4145
(0.3880) (0.3426) (0.0378)
Size −0.5244∗∗∗ −0.5440∗∗∗ −0.5440∗∗∗
(0.1219) (0.1000) (0.1000)
Herfindahl Index 5.432 4.41e-04 4.41e-04
(4.731e-04) (4.29e-04) (4.29e-04)
GDP −0.0038 −0.0023 −0.0023
(0.0292) (0.0285) (0.0285)
Fixed Effects
- Firm YES YES YES
- Industry YES YES YES
- Region YES YES YES
- Year YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq 0.7470 0.8354 0.7552
No. of obs. 3,895 5,118 5,118
Notes: The dependent variable is the average interest rate on the stock of bank debt. We report the coefficients obtained
through fixed-effects regressions at the firm level and the corresponding standard errors in brackets. Each regression
includes 18 industry dummies, a full set of regional dummies to control for unobserved geographical heterogeneity, and a
full set of year dummies to control for aggregate shocks. The dummy results are not reported to save space. The variable
Legal Costs is the two-year lagged average of the length of trials concluded in days (Column (1)). In Column (2) and
(3), we use two non-linear transformations of the average length, namely log(x) and (xλ − 1)/λ, respectively. Age is
the number of years since the foundation of a firm. Age Squared is the square of the firm’s age. Listed is a dummy
variable equal to one if the firm is listed and zero otherwise. Asset Intangibility is the share of research and development
expenditures over total capital. Size is the logarithm of the stock of capital. Herfindahl Index is the squared sum of the
share of credit provided by all the banks operating in the reference market. GDP is the per-capita regional gross domestic
product. *Significant at 10%; ***Significant at 1%.
This argument is confirmed by the data. We implement a Box–Cox transfor-
mation of the legal variable, to control for non-linear effects.12 When applied to
the average length of trials, the maximum likelihood estimate of λ determines the
functional form of the legal variable, where λ = 1 implies linearity. The results
of the Box–Cox transformation with respect to cost of finance, firm size, and
leverage are reported in Tables 8, 9 and 10. In Table 8, columns (2) and (3), the
12. A Box–Cox transformation of a variable x, denoted by xλ, is defined as xλ = (xλ − 1)/λ if
λ = 0 and xλ = ln(x) if λ = 0.
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Table 9. Lagged and non-linear legal costs and firm size.
Dependent variable: Firm Size
Lagged Legal Costs Non-Linear Legal Costs
Bi-Annual Lagged Average Box–Cox Transformation
λ̂: 13.16∗ (s.e.: 7.18)
(xλ − 1)/λ
(1) (2)
Legal Costs −2.499e-04∗∗ −4.37e-37∗∗
(1.104e-04) (1.39e-37)
Age −0.0069∗∗∗ 0.0056∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0009)
Age Squared 3.75e-05∗∗∗ 3.3e-05∗∗∗
(3.67e-05) (6.36e-06)
Listed Firm 0.0576 −0.0803
(0.0643) (0.0566)
Asset Intangibility −0.7402∗∗∗ −0.4605∗∗∗
(0.0549) (0.0378)
Herfindahl Index −1.104e-04 2.04e-04
(0.732e-04) (6.08e-05)
GDP −0.0023 −0.0016
(0.0040) (0.0038)
Fixed Effects
- Firm YES YES
- Industry YES YES
- Region YES YES
- Year YES YES
Adj. R-sq 0.9813 0.9810
No. of obs. 6,775 10,179
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the stock of capital. We report the coefficients obtained through
fixed-effects regressions at the firm level and the corresponding standard errors in brackets. Each regression includes 18
industry dummies, a full set of regional dummies to control for unobserved geographical heterogeneity, and a full set
of year dummies to control for aggregate shocks. The dummy results are not reported to save space. The variable Legal
Costs is the two-year lagged average of the length of trials concluded in days (Column (1)). In Column (2), we use a
non-linear transformation of the average length, namely (xλ − 1)/λ. Age is the number of years since the foundation of
a firm. Age Squared is the square of the firm’s age. Listed is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed and zero
otherwise. Asset Intangibility is the share of research and development expenditures over total capital. Size is the logarithm
of the stock of capital. Herfindahl Index is the squared sum of the share of credit provided by all the banks operating in
the reference market. GDP is the per-capita regional gross domestic product. *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%;
***Significant at 1%.
estimated value of λ is −0.0038 with a standard error of 0.6693. We cannot reject
the hypothesis that λ = 0 or λ = 1, in which cases the transformation of the legal
variable is log(x) and (xλ − 1)/λ), respectively. In both cases, the coefficient of
the legal variable is still positive and statistically significant. In the specification
for firm size (Table 9, column (2)) the estimated λ is 13.1605, which is statisti-
cally significant at the 10% level. The coefficient of the transformed legal variable
is negative, as expected, and statistically significant at the 5% level. Finally, for
leverage (Table 10, columns (2) and (3)), the transformed legal variable is not
statistically significant, regardless of the Box–Cox transformation. In summary,
all these results suggest that potential non-linearities of the legal variable do not
change our findings.
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Table 10. Lagged and non-linear legal costs and leverage ratio.
Dependent variable: Leverage Ratio
Lagged Legal Costs Non-Linear Legal Costs
Bi-Annual Lagged Average Box–Cox Transformation
λ̂: −0.23 (s.e.: 0.89)
log(x) (xλ − 1)/λ
(1) (2) (3)
Legal Costs −1.54e-05 −0.0106 −0.0357
(5.35e-05) (0.0132) (0.0432)
Age 1.74e-04 −6.66e-06 −5.27e-06
(4.687e-04) (4.35e-04) (4.35e-04)
Age Squared 1.10e-06 2.16e-07 2.10e-07
(3.00e-06) (2.77e-06) (2.77e-06)
Listed Firm 0.0100 0.0035 −0.0035
(0.0285) (0.0242) (0.0242)
Asset Intangibility −0.0374 −0.0054 −0.0054
(0.0251) (0.0119) (0.0119)
Size 0.0750∗∗∗ 0.0623∗∗∗ 0.0623∗∗∗
(0.0065) (0.0058) (0.0058)
Herfindahl Index −5.00e-07 5.67e-06 −5.64e-06
(3.29e-05) (2.86e-05) (2.86e-05)
GDP 9.649e-04 0.0010 0.0010
(1.765e-03) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Fixed Effects
- Firm YES YES YES
- Industry YES YES YES
- Region YES YES YES
- Year YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq 0.7073 0.7990 0.7235
No. of obs. 6,529 8,332 8,332
Notes: The dependent variable is the leverage ratio defined as debt over debt plus equity (short term plus long term debt
toward financial institutions over the sum of book value of equity and financial debt). We report the coefficients obtained
through fixed-effects regressions at the firm level and the corresponding standard errors in brackets. Each regression
includes 18 industry dummies, a full set of regional dummies to control for unobserved geographical heterogeneity, and a
full set of year dummies to control for aggregate shocks. The dummy results are not reported to save space. The variable
Legal Costs is the two-year lagged average of the length of trials concluded in days (Column (1)). In Column (2) and
(3), we use two non-linear transformations of the average length, namely log(x) and (xλ − 1)/λ, respectively. Age is
the number of years since the foundation of a firm. Age Squared is the square of the firm’s age. Listed is a dummy
variable equal to one if the firm is listed and zero otherwise. Asset Intangibility is the share of research and development
expenditures over total capital. Size is the logarithm of the stock of capital. Herfindahl Index is the squared sum of the
share of credit provided by all the banks operating in the reference market. GDP is the per-capita regional gross domestic
product. ***Significant at 1%.
2.4.4. Alternative interpretation: bankruptcy story. So far we have interpreted
the average length of trials as an institutional parameter that describes the func-
tioning of local jurisdictions. However, in a more general setting, this variable
could be the result of an imbalance between the demand for law enforcement and
its supply. The supply is given by the resources allocated to the judicial district.
The demand depends on actual or potential litigation and may be affected by local
economic conditions. A negative economic shock in a given region on a given
year could increase the number of bankruptcies, hence the demand for justice, and
possibly as a result the length of trials. Simultaneously, bad economic conditions
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could drive up the cost of credit. Thus, one could argue that our results are com-
patible with the enforcement variable being a proxy for number of bankruptcies,
hence regional economic shocks.
However, our results do not support this alternative interpretation, for several
reasons. First, in all the regressions we control not only for regional and time
differences, but also for the regional per capita income (GDP), which should
take account of idiosyncratic regional economic shocks. Moreover, as discussed
in Section 2.1, there is a weakly positive—rather than negative—cross-sectional
correlation between GDP (both aggregate and per capita) and the average length
of trials. This implies a weak but positive correlation between good economic
performance and bad law enforcement, the opposite of what a bankruptcy story
would imply.
As an additional robustness check, we compute the time-series correlation
between the legal variable and the per-capita income, for each region. If our sample
contains negative shocks that increase the length of trials (e.g., bankruptcies), we
should find a negative correlation between the two variables in most regions. First,
we calculate the correlation between the average length of trials and the first differ-
ences of GDP, since changes in GDP should capture economic shocks better. In
this case, all regions have a correlation not significantly different from zero at the
5% level. The average correlation is −0.05. We obtain very similar results using
the growth rate rather than first differences of GDP. In addition, we also consider
the first differences in levels of both variables (GDP and length of trials). Only
one region shows a correlation significantly different from zero, but it is positive.
Finally, we calculate the correlation between the average length and the growth
rate of GDP lagged one period, namely (GDPt−1−GDPt−2)/GDPt−2, to take into
account that the effect of economic shocks on bankruptcy and therefore on courts
might need time to unfold. Only one region shows a negative and statistically
significant correlation; the average correlation is relatively low, −0.15.
Finally, as a last test, we add the proxies for regional economic shocks above
as explanatory variables in all the regressions. Tables 11, 12, and 13 contain
these robustness checks for cost of credit, firm size, and leverage. In column (1)
of the three tables we control for GDP lagged one period. In column (2), we
include the first differences in GDP and in column (3) we use differences in GDP
lagged one period. Finally, in the last two columns, we control for the growth rate
and the growth rate lagged one period. Overall, the previous findings are con-
firmed. The legal variable keeps the expected sign and its statistical significance
in all the specifications for cost of credit and firm size, and it has no significant
effect on leverage. None of the controls of GDP are statistically significant at the
conventional levels.
In summary, the absence of any significant correlation over time between
enforcement and economic conditions and the additional robustness checks
reported in Tables 11, 12, and 13 suggest that a bankruptcy story is unlikely
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to be driving our findings. Clearly, even controlling for differences in per capita
GDP or for other types of heterogeneity at the regional and industry levels might
not be enough to rule out the potential endogeneity of the quality of the judicial
system. Ideally, we would need to appeal to legal reforms that affect judicial dis-
tricts in different ways, but these events are very rare and are absent from our
sample.
3. The Theoretical Framework
In this section, we suggest an economic mechanism whereby law enforcement of
credit contracts interacts with firms’ policies. This mechanism is modeled using
a dynamic general equilibrium framework.
We consider an economy with overlapping generations.13 In each period, a
new generation of mass equal to 1 is born and lives for two periods. Individuals
are risk-neutral and their utility depends on the expected level of consumption in
the two periods (ctt , ctt+1) and on the working time in the first period (ltt ). The
superscript refers to the period in which the generation is born, the subscript to
that of consumption or labor decisions. For simplicity, the utility function takes
the following form:
EU = E[ctt + ctt+1 − (ltt )2],
where agents do not discount future consumption.14
In the first period, individuals have no initial wealth. They can work and
save.15 At the beginning of the second period, they decide how to invest their
savings, with two alternatives: a bank account with gross fixed risk-free interest
at rate rt+1 (in this case, they do not work) and an entrepreneurial activity. The
project is risky and consists in producing the only consumption good available in
the economy. Entrepreneurs may ask for a bank loan.
Banks collect funds (deposits) from workers to finance entrepreneurs. Banks
are risk-neutral. There is free entry into the banking industry. Finally, there is a
legal system whose activity affects the degree of enforcement of creditors’ right
to repossess collateral.
To make our model a good representation of the Spanish case, we divide the
economy into two regions, A and B. We assume perfect integration of capital
markets, but complete segmentation in the labor markets. These two assumptions
capture the Spanish economic situation realistically enough. Financial integration
13. We use a general equilibrium framework because we want to endogenize the wealth endowment
of the entrepreneur.
14. This last assumption is not necessary to get our results, but it greatly simplifies the calculations.
15. We assume that at the initial period only the old generation has a positive amount of wealth.
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between districts or regions is very high. Banking law is national, and there are no
restrictions on domestic capital movements. But the labor market, according to
the Economically Active Population Survey (EAPS), is highly segmented.16 For
instance, the proportion of unemployed who would be willing to take a job with a
change of residence (not necessarily even a change of region) is under 30% for all
our sample period (28.5% in 1996 and 23.5% in 1999). Unemployment rates vary
substantially among districts and regions. In 1996, Andalucia and Extremadura
had unemployment rates of about 32%, twice as high as in Baleares (15.8%)
and Rioja (14.9%). We observe similar differences for other regions and for the
following three years.
3.1. Credit Contract and Law Enforcement
In this section, we describe the credit contract between entrepreneurs and banks.
To simplify, we consider the agent born in period t , removing the superscript from
all the variables.
If the agent decides to become an entrepreneur, in period t+1 he has to choose
the optimal amount of capital (kt+1) and labor (lt+1). For a given amount of capi-
tal invested, he borrows (kt+1 −St ) from the bank, where St is saving from period
t . We only consider debt contracts.17 The realization of the project is stochastic.
If the good state occurs, then production is equal to yt+1 = min{αkt+1, lt+1},
otherwise zero.18 Notice that, whereas the capital is provided by individuals
belonging to the older generation (born in period t), labor is supplied by the
younger generation of period t + 1.
Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we introduce asymmetric informa-
tion (moral hazard) in the credit relation, by assuming that the probability of
the good state depends on the entrepreneur’s effort.19 The entrepreneur chooses
between two levels of effort: high (exertion) or low (shirking). Exertion yields
the probability ph of success and no private benefits to the entrepreneur. Shirking
yields the probability pl < ph of success and private benefits Bkt+1 > 0.20 Effort
is not observable by the bank. Success and failure are observed at no cost. After
16. EAPS is a quarterly survey conducted by the National Institute of Statistics since 1996 on a
sample of 200,000 individuals. The survey reports information on employment status and changes
(employment and unemployment rates) and of non-participants (participation rate) by region, district,
sector, gender, and level of education.
17. Excluding outside equity from the model is consistent with the characteristics of our sample,
where only 3.76% of firms are listed.
18. Allowing for substitution between the two inputs does not lead to closed-form solutions.
However, the results of the model do not build on this assumption, as explained later in Section 4.
19. Projects are independently distributed across individuals.
20. We can interpret private benefits as a saving on the disutility from effort. We assume that private
benefits are linear in the amount of capital goods, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).
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the realization of the project, the entrepreneur repays the loan and pays wages to
the workers. We assume no depreciation of capital assets. Limited liability is also
assumed.
Following the literature on credit rationing (see Bester, 1995; Chan and
Kanatas 1985, among others), we consider a collateralized debt contract. The
entrepreneur can pledge all the investment goods, kt+1, as collateral to the lender.
If he defaults, the bank has the right to repossess, but enforcement of this right
requires the intervention of the judicial system. Courts are not efficient, which
introduces a cost for the creditor in the form of a reduction in the effective liqui-
dation value of the collateral asset. We assume that the worse the performance of
courts (the longer trials are), the less the liquidation value of the asset, denoted
by gkt+1, where 0 < g < 1. Better enforcement corresponds to a larger g. This
is a fair description of the actual bankruptcy procedure in Spain, which is unable
to guarantee a reasonable recovery rate for creditors. This is mostly because of
the long time that courts take to complete trials (European Commission 2003).
The financial sector collects funds (kt+1 − St+1) to finance the productive
sector and repay a gross fixed interest rate, rt+1, on deposits. If the project is
successful, the entrepreneur and the bank share the cash-flow left after the payment
of wages: (yt+1 −wt+1lt+1). The bank receives Rbt+1 and the entrepreneur Ret+1.
In case of default, the bank gets the liquidation value of the collateral net of the
legal costs, gkt+1.
We make the following two assumptions:
Assumption 1. pl(1 + α) + (1 − pl)g < 1,
Assumption 2. [phα − Bph
(ph − pl) ] >
3
2
.
Assumption 1 implies that the project has a negative present value when the
borrower shirks, putting out the low level of effort. Assumption 2 guarantees that
the bank’s cash flow in the good state is higher than the collateral value of the
assets in the bad state.
3.2. Optimal Credit Contract
Consider an entrepreneur with saving St . In period t + 1 he chooses the amount
of capital (kt+1), the labor input (ldt+1), and the effort level. He takes as given the
wage, wt+1 and the deposit rate rt+1. The maximization problem is
max
kt+1,lt+1,Rbt+1,Ret+1
E(ct+1) = ph
[
Ret+1 + kt+1
]
,
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subject to
[
Ret+1 + kt+1
]
ph ≥ pl
[
Ret+1 + kt+1
] + Bkt+1,
phR
b
t+1 + (1 − ph)gkt+1 = (kt+1 − St )rt+1,
[min{αkt+1, lt+1} − wt+1lt+1] = Ret+1 + Rbt+1.
The objective function is the entrepreneur’s expected level of consumption
at the end of the second period.
The first condition represents the incentive compatibility constraint of the
entrepreneur. It requires that the total expected utility from exertion (left-hand
side) is equal or greater than from shirking (right-hand side). To avoid trivial cases
in which this constraint is not binding, we introduce the following assumption:
Assumption 3.
B
(ph − pl) > 1.
The second constraint is the participation constraint for the bank. The assump-
tion of free entry implies that the total expected income from financing the
risky project (left-hand side) is equal to the repayments of the deposit contracts
(right-hand side).
The last equation is a feasibility condition: The maximum cash-flow that
entrepreneur and bank share cannot be larger than the share of the total production
left after paying the wages.
Solving for the optimal credit contract yields the following demands for
capital and labor:
kt+1 = rt+1St
rt+1 − γ + phαwt+1 , (2)
ldt+1 =
αrt+1St
rt+1 − γ + phαwt+1 , (3)
whereγ = ph(1+α)−[Bph/(ph−pl)]+(1−ph)g. The denominator in equations
(2) and (3) must be positive and lower than rt+1, otherwise entrepreneurs would
not borrow. These two conditions are satisfied under Assumption 2.21
21. The denominator in equations (2) and (3) is positive and lower than rt+1, if the following two
requirements are satisfied:
[ph(1 + α) + (1 − ph)g − (phB)/(ph − pl) − rt+1] < αphwt+1
< [ph(1 + α) + (1 − ph)g − (phB)/(ph − pl)].
In principle, these two conditions must hold at any time. Because we concentrate our attention on
the steady state, we only require that they hold in the steady state. This allows us to rewrite them
as follows: 1 < [ph(1 + α) − (phB)/(ph − pl)]. It is easy to show that this condition is always
satisfied under Assumption 2.
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Both demand functions are decreasing in wt+1 and rt+1. Moreover, they are
increasing in the entrepreneur’s savings, because greater initial wealth increases
the availability of external funds and allows the entrepreneur to enlarge the scale
of production.
Finally, we can derive the expected return of the entrepreneurial activity,
defined as the expected consumption level per unit of saving invested:
μt+1 =
ph
[
Ret+1 + kt+1
]
St
= rt+1Bph
(rt+1 + phαwt+1 − γ )(ph − pl) . (4)
As expected, μt+1 is decreasing in the cost of inputs, wages, and deposit
rate. Moreover, for given wt+1 and rt+1, it is increasing in B and (ph − pl).
Higher private benefits (higher B) tighten the borrower’s incentive compatibility
condition. Therefore, a larger cash-flow is needed to induce the entrepreneur to
exert high effort. Conversely, higher (ph − pl) increases the cost of shirking and
reduces μt+1. In addition, for given wt+1 and rt+1, higher g increases μt+1. The
intuition is that better legal institutions relax the participation constraint of the
bank. As a consequence, for a given amount of saving, the entrepreneur gets more
external financing. Production and profits increase.
3.3. Workers’ and Investors’ Decisions
Consider now the maximization problem faced by the consumer in the first period.
He chooses the level of consumption in each period and the supply of labor in the
first period. Because he is risk-neutral and does not discount future consumption,
it is optimal to save all of his income in order to consume only in the second
period, (ct = 0, ct+1 = St max{rt+1, μt+1}). Total saving depends on the labor
supplied, the wage, and the probability of being paid, St = phwt lt . Given the
two investment alternatives, the consumer will chose the one with higher expected
return. The maximization problem can be redefined in term of labor supply choice,
as follows:
max
lt
EU = phwt lt max{rt+1, μt+1} − l2t .
We can easily derive the optimal level of labor supply (lst ) and the optimal saving
function (St ) as follows:
lst =
1
2
wtph max{rt+1, μt+1}, (5)
St = 12w
2
t ph max{rt+1, μt+1}. (6)
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jeea/article-abstract/8/4/776/2295908/Law-Enforcement-and-Firm-Financing-Theory-and
by guest
on 26 September 2017
808 Journal of the European Economic Association
Both labor supply and savings depend positively on the wage rate and the return
on investment in the second period.22 We are now able to solve for the steady
state equilibrium.
3.4. Steady State Equilibrium
We assume that the two regions, A and B, are the same in all ways except enforce-
ment: gA > gB . Capital markets are perfectly integrated, but there is no labor
mobility.23 The proportion of individuals who decide to become entrepreneurs in
region i is πi .
Definition 1. We define the steady state equilibrium as the pair of wages (w∗A
and w∗B ), the risk-free interest rate (r∗), the expected return to entrepreneurial
activity (μ∗), and the number of entrepreneurs in each region (π∗A and π∗B ) such
as to solve the following set of equations:
SA(r
∗, w∗A) + SB(r∗, w∗B) = π∗AkA(r∗, w∗A) + πBkB(r∗, w∗B), (7)
lsi (r
∗, w∗i ) = πildi (r∗, w∗i ), i = A,B, (8)
r∗ = μi, i = A,B. (9)
Equation (7) represents the equilibrium condition for the credit market, Equation
(8) for the labor market. Note that there is a unique equilibrium condition for
the capital market given perfect integration, while the assumption of zero labor
mobility implies two equilibrium conditions for the labor market, one for each
region. Finally, Equation (9) guarantees that agents are indifferent between being
depositors and entrepreneurs.
This system has the following solution:
μ∗ = r∗ = ph(1 + α) + 12 (1 − ph)(gA + gB) −
1
2
(
1 +
√
1 − z2), (10)
w∗A = (2αph)−1[(1 + z) +
√
1 − z2], (11)
w∗B = (2αph)−1[(1 − z) +
√
1 − z2], (12)
π∗A =
2Bph
[ph(1 + α) + z − 12 (1 − z +
√
1 − z2)]μ, (ph − pl)
, (13)
22. Notice that the first-order conditions are sufficient to characterize the optimal solution, because
the problem is concave.
23. As explained previously, these two assumptions capture the actual degree of economic
integration among Spanish regions.
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π∗B =
2Bph
[ph(1 + α) + z − 12 (1 + z +
√
1 − z2)]μ(ph − pl)
(14)
where z = (1 − ph)(gA − gB). The proportion of entrepreneurs is strictly
positive and lower than 1. Therefore, the two extreme situations—all individ-
uals are entrepreneurs or all are depositors—cannot be an equilibrium. From
equations (11) and (12), it follows that better creditor protection implies higher
wages (wA > wB ). Given the fully integrated capital markets and assuming no
arbitrage among investment opportunities, the price of capital and the return to
entrepreneurial activity must be equal in the two regions, so differences in law
enforcement (gA > gB ) translate fully into differences in wages (wA > wB ).
4. Comparative Statics
Let us investigate the role of the legal system. We assume that courts are more
efficient in enforcing the creditor’s rights in region A, that is, gA > gB . We divide
the analysis into two parts. First, we discuss the implications for firm activity,
focusing on external financing, leverage, size, and the cost of credit. Then we
analyze the effects on the region’s capital stock and output.
4.1. Law Enforcement and the Activity of Firms
Let us denote the amount of external financing by di = (ki −Si) and the leverage
ratio by di/ki , where i = A,B.24
Proposition 1. Firms located in region A (where creditors’ rights are more
strictly enforced) get more external finance, are larger but with the same leverage
ratio as in region B; that is, if gA > gB , then dA > dB , kA > kB , and (dA/kA) =
(dB/kB).
Proof. First, we prove that firm size is higher in region A. We then use this result
to prove the other part of the proposition. Reworking equation (2), we obtain the
capital assets invested by each entrepreneur in each region as a function of interest
rate and wage: kA = [r2(ph − pl)w2A/(2B)], kB = [r2(ph − pl)w2B/2B]. From
equations (11) and (12), it follows that wA > wB . This implies kA > kB . Then,
taking into account that
di = ki − Si = Si γi − phαwi
r − γi − phαwi ,
24. There are many different definitions of “leverage” in the corporate finance literature. We use
the broadest, the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.
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and Si = (w2i phr)/2, we can rewrite the two leverage ratios as follows:
dA
kA
= dB
kB
= 1 − Bph
r(ph − pl) .
From the two previous results, it follows that, if gA > gB , then dA > dB .
It is worth remarking that whereas the amount of external finance is linear in
the entrepreneur’s initial wealth, the leverage ratio does not depend on this factor.
Moreover, external finance and leverage both depend on the legal variable, but
via different channels. Stronger enforcement in region A increases the liquidation
value of the collateral, so the bank’s participation constraint is less stringent. For
a given amount of the initial wealth, banks extend more credit (positive partial
equilibrium effect). The greater availability of external financing increases the
expected rate of return to the entrepreneurial activity and with it the equilibrium
interest rate on deposits. This produces a wedge between the two rates in region B.
The safe banking investment, which benefits from better enforcement by drawing
interregional funds, provides a higher return than the risky project. Because bank
deposits are now more profitable, fewer agents decide to become entrepreneurs,
reducing not only the demand for capital but also the demand for labor in region
B. Adjustments in the national capital market and in the two labor markets reduce
wages in region B and increase them in region A. At the end, the benefit of better
enforcement in region A (positive partial equilibrium effect) is fully offset by the
higher labor cost (general equilibrium effect).
These two opposite effects keep the leverage ratio constant across regions
and explain why we do not find any regional effect of differences in law enforce-
ment. This result, which may seem counterintuitive only in a partial equilibrium
approach, does not imply that legal institutions have no effect on capital struc-
ture. In fact, if we consider the longitudinal rather than the cross-sectional effects,
we find that an increment in enforcement in region A increases leverage in both
regions by increasing the return to entrepreneurial activity. The interesting point
is that there is a full spill-over effect on region B, working through the national
capital market. The rise in the national deposit rate raises the return to enterprise
in region B and increases leverage by the same amount as in region A.25
The result that the benefit of a better enforcement is fully offset by higher
labor costs explains also why the coefficient of savings in the definition of external
finance holds constant after changes in the legal variable. This implies that the
effect of cross-sectional differences in enforcement on external finance and capital
stock works only through differences in per capita savings (SA > SB ) driven by
differences in wages (general equilibrium effect). An increment in legal protection
25. One can show that ∂(dA/kA)/∂gA = (1 − ph)[1 + z/
√
1 − z2][Bph/(ph − pl)r]/2 > 0. The
same holds for region B, given that the leverage ratio is the same.
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allows entrepreneurs to pay higher wages, inducing young people to work and
save more. As a consequence, each entrepreneur has a larger wealth endowment,
hence more financing from banks. More external funds and greater initial wealth
allow him to enlarge the scale of production, investing more capital and hiring
more workers.
Before proceeding with the next proposition, let us denote the cost of external
finance by vi = Rbi /di where i = A,B.
Proposition 2. Firms located in the region where legal institutions are weaker
face a higher price for external finance, that is, if gA > gB then vA < vB .
Proof. Rewrite the bank’s participation constraint at the steady state equilibrium
in the two regions as:
phdAvA + (1 − ph)gAkA = dAr,
and
phdBvB + (1 − ph)gBkB = dBr.
Then, using the result that there is only one deposit rate (given integrated capital
markets), we have
(1 − ph)[gA(kA/dA) − gB(kB/dB)] = ph(vB − vA).
Then kA/dA = kB/dB , because they are the inverse of the leverage ratio. It follows
that where legal protection is higher, the average price of credit is lower.
The reason is that banks in the poorer legal environment must charge more
for loans in order to compensate for the lower liquidation value of the collateral.
Notice that even though bank finance is cheaper in regionA, there will be no migra-
tion of entrepreneurs. Even if we allow entrepreneurs to choose their location,
they do not have any incentive to move, given that the return to entrepreneurial
activity is the same in the two regions, namely, (μA=μB ).
Our theoretical analysis provides an explanation for the empirical findings of
Section 2, including the result that leverage is neutral to judicial efficiency.
4.2. Law Enforcement and Aggregate Activity
We have seen that regional differences in law enforcement across regions gener-
ate differences in capital stock. Here, we investigate whether this effect is also
found at the aggregate level. This question is not trivial, because the numbers of
entrepreneurs change and capital is free to move across regions. We denote the
aggregate level of capital and output in each region by Ki and Yi , where i = A,B.
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Proposition 3. The region with better law enforcement has larger aggregate
capital stock and output, that is, if gA > gB , then KA > KB and consequently
YA > YB .
Proof. By multiplying the capital stock per firm by the number of entrepreneurs,
we can rewrite the aggregate capital ratio between the two regions as follows:
KA/KB = (wA/wB)2 [ph(1 + α) + z −
1
2 (1 − z +
√
1 − z2)]
[ph(1 + α) + z − 12 (1 + z +
√
1 − z2)] .
Because wA > wB , a sufficient condition for KA/KB > 1 is
[ph(1 + α) + z](1 +
√
1 − z2) > z2/2.
Then (1 + √1 − z2) > 1 for any value of z. Moreover, z2 < z because z < 1
for any given value of gA and gB . It follows that the previous condition is always
satisfied. Because the output is proportional to capital stock, it also follows that
YA > YB .
As mentioned earlier, more effective protection in region A increases the
national interest rate, given that (∂r/∂gA) = (1 − ph)[1 + z/
√
1 − z2]/2 > 0.
The intuition is that the equilibrium interest rate must be equal to the expected
rate of return to enterprise to prevent some agents from gaining by changing the
allocation of their savings. The expected rate of return to entrepreneurial activity
depends on the productivity of capital in the two states of nature. According to
the credit contract, in case of default the assets are transferred to the bank. The
faster the courts are in completing proceedings, the greater the liquidation value.
It follows that better creditor protection increases the productivity of capital in the
bad state of nature and hence the expected return to the entrepreneurial activity.
Let us note that, further, more effective protection in regionAmight generate a
positive externality in region B, by inducing a flow of savings to region B, which
could increase welfare there. In fact, (SA/KA) = (1 + z +
√
1 − z2)/2 > 1
and (SB/KB) = (1 − z +
√
1 − z2)/2 < 1. Under the condition (1 − z2) >
[ph(1 + α) + (1 − ph)gA − 1], welfare in region B increases.
In particular, we find that differences in firm size between countries (due to
different law enforcement) are magnified with segmentation of capital markets,
because partial and general equilibrium effect have the same sign and they rein-
force each other. Leverage represents an extreme case of this effect, because when
capital markets are segmented differences in law enforcement generate differences
in leverage, but they vanish completely with capital market integration.
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5. Evidence on Savings and Law Enforcement
Our model provides a formal explanation for our empirical findings, including
the result that leverage is neutral to law enforcement. The channel through which
better enforcement benefits both the economy as a whole (greater regional capital
and output) and the private corporate sector (cheaper credit and larger size) is a
general equilibrium effect. Differences in law enforcement induce adjustments in
the two labor markets, boosting wages and then savings in the region with better
enforcement. Individuals in good judicial districts save more than those in poor
ones and are thus able to increase their down-payment on future business activity,
and as a consequence get higher profits. In this section, we use data on savings
to inquire whether the mechanism suggested by the model is plausible for the
Spanish case.
Information on savings in Spain is provided by the National Institute of Statis-
tics (INE) in the Household Income Account (HIA), including data on disposable
income and consumption by year and by region. The sample period with infor-
mation on savings matching information on civil trials goes from 1995 to 1998.
This series only provides household information aggregated at the regional level.
More specifically, the reported values are the sum of disposable income (or con-
sumption) of all households living in a given region in a given year. We measure
savings as the difference between disposable income and consumption; divid-
ing by resident population, we get per capita savings. Table 2 Panel (B) reports
summary statistics of savings. On average, per-capita savings are about 202,530
pesetas (about €1,200), with Asturia having the lowest and La Rioja the largest
per-capita savings in Spain.
Figure 4 shows the univariate regression of per capita savings on the length
of trials. Each observation represents the time-series average of savings and legal
enforcement over 1995–1998 for each region. The figure displays a negative
correlation between the two variables. In line with our theoretical prediction, this
descriptive evidence suggests that in regions where trials are shorter agents save
more. We now turn to more formal analysis to understand whether the graphical
intuition is confirmed. More specifically, we exploit the panel dimension of the
data and add control variables.
Table 14 shows the results of regressing per-capita savings on the degree
of law enforcement using various specifications. In column (1), we include the
regional per-capita income (GDP) to control for geographical differences in eco-
nomic activity. The legal variable has a negative and statistically significant
coefficient (at the 1% level), suggesting that individuals save more in regions
where trials are shorter. As expected, the positive sign on GDP indicates that
savings are greater in richer regions.
Because enforcement could affect saving decisions with a lag, in column (2)
we use the length of trials lagged one period. The coefficient is still negative
and significant (at the 1% level). To account for the possibility that residuals
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Figure 4. Per-capita savings and the length of trials. The figure shows the cross-sectional correlation
between per-capita savings and the length of trials.
for a given region are correlated across years, in column (3) we compute robust
standard errors clustered by region. The legal variable keeps the negative sign
and it is statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficient of GDP remains
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Finally, in column (4), we use
robust standard errors and we add year fixed-effects to control for the dependence
of residuals across regions for a given year. Again, the coefficient of the legal
Table 14. Legal costs and savings.
Dependent variable: Per-capita Savings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Legal Costs −0.2587∗∗∗ −0.2587∗∗ −0.2675∗∗
(0.0604) (0.1113) (0.1151)
GDP 132.1716∗∗∗ 114.0379∗∗∗ 132.1716∗∗∗ 145.6333∗∗∗
(18.9263) (17.5559) (25.3478) (26.7949)
Legal Costslog −0.2386∗∗∗
(0.0603)
Adj. R-sq 0.4236 0.3354 0.4416 0.4977
No. of obs. 65 48 65 65
Notes: The dependent variable is regional per-capita savings. We report the coefficients obtained through ordinary least
squares (OLS) and the corresponding standard errors in brackets. The variable Legal Costs is equal to the average length
of trials concluded in days. GDP is the regional per-capita gross domestic product. Column (1) refers to the baseline
specification. In Column (2), we use Legal Costslag, which is the average length of trials concluded in days, lagged one
period. In Column (3), we compute robust standard errors clustered by region. In Column (4), we use robust standard
errors and we add year fixed-effects. **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%.
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variable is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level and the one of
GDP is positive and significant as in the previous specifications.
The empirical analysis of this section is very simplified, mainly because
data limitations prevent a more compelling exercise. Information on savings and
length of trials is available at the regional level only for a limited number of years.
Moreover, we document a positive relationship between creditor protection and
savings that could also be consistent with other theoretical mechanisms, as long as
they feature a positive effect of legal enforcement on output. In summary, we can
interpret these findings as suggestive that the mechanism implied by the model
is plausible for the Spanish case.
6. Conclusion
The most original aspect of our empirical analysis is the ability to separate the
effects of differences in enforcement from those of the content of laws. We exploit
the variability in the length of trials across Spanish judicial districts to study the
role of law enforcement on firms in a uniform legal framework. We find that in
districts where civil trials are longer bank financing is more costly and firms are
smaller, but there is no significant effect on leverage ratios.
We propose a theoretical explanation for our findings. We use a two-region
dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations, asymmetric
information in credit relations and collateralized credit contracts. Assuming that
the two regions differ only in the behavior of courts, we account for our empir-
ical evidence. The dynamic general equilibrium framework is crucial. We show
that improvements in law enforcement have important general equilibrium effects
influencing individuals’ capital accumulation. These effects are the key mecha-
nism behind our theoretical predictions. Finally, we document a positive empirical
relation between law enforcement and individual savings.
Our analysis could be extended in several directions. For example, it would
be interesting to introduce external equity into the model, to study how the three
sources of finance (entrepreneur’s initial wealth, external equity and bank debt)
vary with the degree of legal protection of creditors. Such an extension would
require the introduction of shareholder protection. We plan to explore these issues
in future research.
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